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ABSTRACT
A Delay-efficient Radiation-hard Digital Design Approach
Using Code Word State Preserving (CWSP) Elements. (May 2008)
Charu Nagpal, B.E., University of Delhi
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sunil Khatri
With the relentless shrinking of the minimum feature size of VLSI Integrated
Circuits (ICs), reduction in operating voltages and increase in operating frequencies,
VLSI circuits are becoming more vulnerable to radiation strikes. As a result, this
problem is now important not only for space and military electronics but also for
consumer ICs. Thus, the design of radiation-hardened circuits has received significant
attention in recent times.
This thesis addresses the radiation hardening issue for VLSI ICs. In particular,
circuit techniques are presented to protect against Single Event Transients (SETs).
Radiation hardening has long been an area of research for memories for space and
military ICs. In a memory, the stored state can flip as a result of a radiation strike.
Such bit reversals in case of memories are known as Single Event Upsets (SEUs).
With the feature sizes of VLSI ICs becoming smaller, radiation-induced glitches have
become a source of concern in combinational circuits also. In combinational circuits,
if a glitch due to a radiation event occurs at the time the circuit outputs are being
sampled, it could lead to the propagation of a faulty value. The current or voltage
glitches on the nodes of a combinational circuit are known as SETs. When an SET
occurring on a node of a logic network is propagated through the gates of the network
and is captured by a latch as a logic error, it is transformed to an SEU.
The approach presented in this thesis makes use of Code Word State Preserving
iv
(CWSP) elements at each flip-flop of the design, along with additional logic to trigger
a recomputation in case a SET induced error is detected. The combinational part of
the design is left unaltered. The CWSP element provides 100% SET protection for
glitch widths up to min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}, where Dmin and Dmax are
the minimum and maximum circuit delay respectively. ∆1 and ∆2 are extra delays
associated with the proposed SET protection circuit. The CWSP circuit has two
inputs - the flip flop output signal and the same signal delayed by a quantity δ. In
case an SET error is detected at the end of a clock period i, then the computation is
repeated in clock period i+1, using the correct output value, which was captured by
the CWSP element in the ith clock period. Unlike previous approaches, the CWSP
element is i) in a secondary computational path and ii) the CWSP logic is designed to
minimally impact the critical delay path of the design. It was found through SPICE
simulations that the delay penalty of the proposed approach (averaged over several
designs) is less than 1%. Thus, the proposed technique is applicable for high-speed
designs, where the additional delay associated with the SET protection must be kept
at a minimum.
vTo my family
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I-A. Need of radiation-hardened design
In recent times, there has been an increased interest in the radiation immunity of
electronic circuits [1] - [13]. This has been an area of significant interest and research
for space or military electronics [11, 12, 14, 15] for many years, due to the significantly
larger rate of radiation strikes in such applications. For space applications, neutrons,
protons and heavy cosmic ions which are trapped in geomagnetic belts [14] produce
intense showers of such radiation. When such ions strike diffusion regions in VLSI
designs, they can deposit a charge, resulting in a voltage spike on the affected circuit
node. If the magnitude of this spike is sufficiently large, an erroneous value may
be computed by the circuit. This is particularly problematic for memories, since
the stored state can flip as a result of such a radiation strike. In case of memories,
these errors are referred to as Single Event Upsets (SEUs). Although SEU induced
errors in sequential elements continue to be problematic, it is expected that the soft
errors in combinational logic will dominate in future technologies [16, 17, 8]. In a
combinational circuit, if the glitch occurs at the time the circuit outputs are being
sampled, it can lead to an incorrect value being latched. Such radiation strikes in
combinational logic are referred to as Single Event Transients (SETs).
With the relentless shrinking of the minimum feature size of VLSI Integrated
Circuits (ICs), there is a corresponding reduction in the dimensions of the diffusion
nodes of the MOSFETS. This results in a reduced diffusion capacitance, and hence,
if charge is dumped on the diffusion node as a consequence of a radiation strike, a
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2large voltage spike may be generated. With operating voltages getting smaller, this
problem is further aggravated. As a result, modern VLSI ICs are significantly more
prone to SET problems [13]. Even though it is true that the amount of radiation
received on the surface of the earth is lower than that in space, the shrinking of
process feature sizes makes terrestrial VLSI ICs susceptible to SET problems [13].
Hence, there has been a significant increase in interest in radiation-tolerant VLSI ICs
in the recent past.
I-B. SEU/SET measurement and modeling
In the radiation community, Linear Energy Transfer (LET ) is commonly used to
measure the charge deposition rate. LET is defined as the amount of energy deposited
in a material per unit of distance traveled, normalized to the material’s density [18].
Cosmic ions have varying LETs, and they result in the deposition of a charge Q in a
semiconductor diffusion region by the following formula [15].
Q = 0.01036 · L · t (1.1)
Here L is the LET of the ion (expressed in MeV-cm2/mg), t is the depth of
the collection volume (expressed in microns), and Q is charge in pC. To derive the
above formula, note that 3.6eV of energy is needed to create an electron-hole pair in
silicon. The density of silicon is 2.42gm/cm3. Thus, for a track length (t) of 1µm,
the LET (= energy in MEV/ density of the material × track length) corresponding
to 3.6eV of energy is equal to (3.6 × 10−6)/(2.42 × 103 × 10−4) = 1.49 × 10−5MeV-
cm2/mg. Now, charge of one electron is equal to 1.60 × 10−7pC. Thus, an LET
of 1MeV-cm2/mg will deposit approximately (1.60 × 10−7/1.49 × 10−5=) 0.01pC of
charge along a track of 1µm [19], which is in agreement with the relationship between
3Q, L and t given in Equation 1.1. For terrestrial electronics, the LET for ionized
particles in silicon is typically below 15MeV [1]. Also, the charge collection depth for
180nm and higher bulk silicon process technologies is relatively constant and equal
to 2µm [1, 19]. Thus, from Equation 1.1, the maximum charge deposited for 180nm
technology is 0.3pC. For uniform technology scaling, the doping density increase by
√
2 in successive process technologies [20]. In [21], it was empirically found that the
charge deposited in a bulk silicon device is inversely related to the doping density.
Thus, the maximum charge deposited for 130nm, 100nm and 70nm processes would
be 0.21pC, 0.15pC and 0.11pC respectively [1].
The amount of charge that is required to cause a bit to be sampled incorrectly
is referred to as the critical charge, QC [22]. With diminishing process feature sizes,
reduced supply voltages and higher operating frequencies, SET problems are a concern
even for terrestrial electronics today, particularly for mission critical applications.
Atmospheric neutrons as well as alpha particles which are created by unstable isotopes
in the IC packaging materials can also cause SET problems.
The current pulse that results from a particle strike is traditionally expressed as
a double exponential function [23, 24]. The expression for this pulse is
I(t) =
Q
(τα − τβ)(e
−t/τα − e−t/τβ ) (1.2)
Here Q is the amount of charge deposited as a result of the ion strike, while
τα is the charge collection time constant for the junction and τβ is the ion track
establishment constant. The τβ value is in the range of 10-50ps, while τα is of the
order of 200ps [1, 17]. For τα = 200ps, τβ = 50ps and Q as given above, it was verified
that a minimum sized inverter (in the 130nm, 100nm and 90nm technologies) resulted
in a glitch large enough to cause incorrect computation.
4I-C. Introduction to the approach used in this thesis
The approach of this thesis uses the Code Word State Preserving (CWSP) circuit of [3]
to achieve SET tolerance. The work of [3] will be described in detail in Chapter II.
In this thesis, the normal circuit computation path is referred to as the functional
path, while the alternative path used to detect and correct SET errors is called the
secondary circuit path. The detection of a faulty computation (due to an SET event)
is done on the secondary path by a watchdog circuit, which uses CWSP elements. In
case of an SET event, the correct value (which is computed by the CWSP element)
is used to repeat the computation, after appropriately introducing a bubble in the
computation pipeline. The main advantages of this approach are:
• This approach achieves SET tolerance for glitches of duration up to min{(Dmin−
∆1)/2, (Dmax−∆2)/2}, where Dmin, Dmax are the minimum and maximum de-
lays of the design and ∆1, ∆2 are additional delay in the secondary circuit
path. Since the CWSP elements are connected on a secondary path as opposed
to the functional computation path of the circuit, there is a minimal (less than
1% on average) speed penalty. This is achieved since the secondary circuit
path containing the watchdog circuit is connected to the inputs and outputs
of the functional circuit in a manner that additional parasitic capacitances are
minimized.
• The results with this approach are better than another approach which uses
CWSP elements [3], which has a delay overhead of 28.65%, (compared to about
1% for the proposed scheme). Also, [3] handles smaller glitches (0.45ns) com-
pared to the approach of this thesis (which handles glitches of width 0.5ns and
0.6ns for Q=100fC and 150fC [1] respectively). Contrasted with an approach
that employs gate resizing [1], the average circuit areas with the proposed ap-
5proach are comparable, while the delay penalties (0.54%) are much smaller than
those of [1] (which has a delay penalty of about 2.8%).
• The proposed approach achieves 100% SET protection (for a glitch of Q up
to 150ps with τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps) which is not the case for [1], which
guarantees 90% circuit protection for the same values of Q, τα and τβ.
I-D. Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II discusses some pre-
vious work in this area. A classification of various techniques available for radiation
hardening is given. The work of [2, 3] is explained in detail. The CWSP element
approach of [2, 3] is exploited and augmented in the work presented in this thesis.
Chapter III explains the approach of this thesis in detail. In Chapter III, the
system level design is first explained, then the circuit level details are provided. An
analysis of the radiation tolerance of the proposed approach follows. Also, the deriva-
tion of the maximum tolerable glitch width is presented in this chapter.
In Chapter IV, experimental results are provided. Finally, this thesis is concluded
in Chapter V.
6CHAPTER II
PREVIOUS WORK
There has been a great deal of work on radiation-tolerant circuit design. In this
chapter, the work done in this field is broadly classified into two categories. In sec-
tion II-A, the approaches which provide an analysis of soft errors and their effects are
presented. In section II-B, design approaches for radiation hardening are presented.
In subsections II-B.1 and II-B.2, the design approaches of [1] and [2, 3] respectively
are explained in greater detail as the results in this thesis are compared with these
contemporary approaches. The motivation for using these approaches for comparison
was that amongst the SET-tolerant design approaches reviewed, [1] and [2, 3] had the
best results in terms of delay and area respectively.
II-A. SEU/SET analysis approaches
One area of study in the field of radiation-hardened circuit design employs device
physics to model radiation strikes accurately. This involves analyzing the SET and
SEU faults using circuit layout information and 3D modeling of the MOSFET de-
vices [25, 26]. These simulators allow a precise characterization of SETs, but they are
computationally intensive. To reduce the computational cost, circuit level techniques
for SET characterization are commonly used. The circuit level techniques model SETs
with a transient current source. The double exponential function which is typically
used to model this transient current source was provided in Equation 1.2 [23]. The
approaches of [27, 28, 24] involve mathematically solving the non-linear equations to
derive an analytical model for radiation-induced transients. These techniques aim at
finding a fast and accurate analytical model to determine the impact of a radiation
strike. This information may be used by the designer to test the resilience of the
7design and achieve the level of protection required.
Historically, the study of soft errors was mostly limited to space and military
electronics, due to the significantly large rate of radiation strikes in these applica-
tions. Several papers report the experimental studies on SEU in space electronics for
SRAMs [15, 22], DRAMs [29], SRAM based Virtex FPGAs [7, 10, 11], flash memory
based FPGAs [12], etc. Even though it is true that the amount of radiation received
on the surface of the earth is lower than in space, the shrinking of process feature
sizes makes contemporary terrestrial VLSI ICs susceptible to SET problems [30] as
well.
Earlier, SEUs were considered problematic mainly for memories [13, 31], because
SEU events can flip the stored state of a memory element. Also, the probability of
a radiation strike is higher in memories as they have the largest number and density
of bits [32]. In [13], the authors provide a built-in current sensor (BICS) to detect
SEU events in an SRAM. The work of [31] studies the SEUs in DRAMs due to the
alpha particles generated by the packaging material of semiconductor devices [33].
Although SEU induced errors in sequential elements continue to be problematic,
it is expected that the soft errors in combinational logic will dominate in future
technologies [16, 17, 8].
A particle strike resulting in a bit-flip on some node in a circuit may be incon-
sequential because of logical [34], electrical [35] and temporal masking [36]. Logical
masking occurs when the effect of a glitch is not propagated to the circuit outputs.
For example, if one input of an AND gate is always zero, then a glitch on the second
input of the AND gate is inconsequential. Electrical masking is the attenuation of
a radiation induced glitch as it propagates through a series of digital gates along a
circuit path. Temporal masking occurs when an SET in combinational logic occurs
outside the clocking window of a latch/flip-flop and is therefore silently ignored. An
8analysis of SEU error rates is presented in [34] and [35]. These approaches account
for logical and electrical masking respectively. An analysis as well as a hardening
approach based on temporal masking is presented in [36].
II-B. Radiation-hardened design approaches
As mentioned in section II-A, soft errors were historically considered to be of im-
portance mostly for space and military applications [15]. Also, soft errors were con-
sidered problematic mostly for memories [32]. As a result, most of the radiation-
hardened design techniques in the past were developed for space and military appli-
cations [37, 10, 11] and/or focused on radiation tolerance of memories [38]. However,
with the reducing minimum feature size of VLSI Integrated Circuits (ICs), reduction
in operating voltages and increase in operating frequencies, radiation-hardened circuit
design has become important both for terrestrial applications [30] and combinational
circuits [17, 8].
The radiation hardened design approaches can be classified as device level, circuit
level and system level [1, 32]. The device level approaches involve a fundamental
change or enhancement of the fabrication process to improve the radiation immunity
of a design [39]. Circuit level hardening is achieved by using special circuit design
techniques that reduce the vulnerability of a circuit to radiation strikes. Transistor
sizing [4] is an example of this category. The concept of [4] is combined with logical
masking and applied at gate level in [1], which is explained in detail in section II-
B.1. The device and circuit level approaches are typically fault avoidance approaches,
while system level approaches typically involve use of fault detection and tolerance
mechanisms. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) [40] is a classical example of a system
level design approach. However, it has an area overhead of 200%. A recent approach
9uses Code Word State Preserving (CWSP) elements [2, 3] to achieve the protection
realized by TMR [40] with a much lower average area overhead. This approach is
explained in detail in section II-B.2.
II-B.1. Gate sizing to radiation harden combinational logic [1]
Although gate resizing [4, 1] is orthogonal to the method described in this thesis,
the results obtained for the proposed method are compared with [1] as well. It is
important to understand how radiation hardening can be obtained with gate sizing.
When a cosmic ray passes through the drain of a transistor, a short is momentarily
created between the drain and the substrate [18]. This results in a current spike for
a short duration of time (which is modeled by Equation 1.2 described earlier). The
charge deposited depends on the track length (Equation 1.1) which is independent
of the device size. Thus, the maximum amount of charge deposited for a given
technology will be the same regardless of the size of the device. Now, an upsized
gate has a higher drive strength and it will discharge the charge deposited due to
the radiation event faster, resulting in a smaller glitch. Thus, radiation hardening
can be achieved by sizing up the gates sufficiently so that they can tolerate the worst
case charge (Q) for a particular technology. However, protecting all the gates in
this manner can lead to an extremely high area overhead. For instance, for a 70nm
technology, an inverter driving another inverter of the same drive strength needs to
be sized up to 7X (11X) to tolerate Q, τα and τβ values of 100fC (150fC), 200ps and
50ps respectively. These values of Q, τα and τβ are appropriate for 70nm and are
used by [1]. The selective sizing approach of [1] limits the area overhead to 42.95%,
but guarantees only 90% protection. Note that the probability of an SEU strike is
lower for a smaller device because the area exposed is less. However, if there is an
SEU event on a smaller device, it results in a glitch of greater magnitude. Thus, a
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minimum sized inverter is used for any worst case simulations.
The approach of [1] limits the area overhead to 42.95% by using selective sizing
based on logical masking. In [1], the probability of logical masking (Plogicalmasking) at
a gate is computed as
Plogicalmasking = 1− Psensitization
where Psensitization is the probability of sensitization i.e. the probability that there
exists a functionally sensitized path from the gate to the primary output(s) or memory
element(s). Psensitization is obtained by applying random input patterns and using fault
simulation to check which gates can be sensitized. The next step is to process the
gates in the decreasing order of Psensitization (increasing order of logical masking) until
the coverage objective is met. The processing step involves upsizing the gate for SET
resilience and the coverage is calculated as the sum of Psensitization of the hardened
gates divided by the sum of Psensitization of all the gates in the circuit. Once the
coverage reaches the objective (of 90% in [1]), the remaining gates are not hardened.
II-B.2. The CWSP-based approach [2, 3]
In this section, the approach of [2, 3] is explained in detail.
Figure II.1 illustrates how CWSP elements are utilized in a circuit, using the
approach of [2]. For the moment, assume that the CWSP element tolerates SET
glitches of width up to δ, on any internal circuit node.
Consider a gate G which drives the flip-flop in the original design, as shown in
Figure II.1 (a). In the CWSP-based SET-resilient design approach of [2], each gate
whose output is connected to a flip-flop input is replaced by a corresponding CWSP
element, as shown in Figure II.1 (b). For a k input gate, the corresponding CWSP
element has 2k inputs. One set of k inputs are connected to the inputs of the gate
11
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Fig. II.1. CWSP based SET tolerance of [2]
that the CWSP element replaces. The other set of k inputs are connected to the
delayed version (by a delay value δ) of the first set of k inputs. This is illustrated
in Figure II.1 (b). The resulting circuit of Figure II.1 (b) tolerates SET glitches of
width up to δ.
How the CWSP element tolerates glitches of width up to δ is explained next.
Figure II.2 illustrates the CWSP circuits for an inverter and a NAND2 gate. In
Figure II.2, the inputs a and b are the un-delayed inputs, while the inputs a∗ and b∗
are delayed versions of a and b respectively (delayed by δ time units). Consider the
CWSP element of either the INVERTER or the NAND2 gate. When the input a = a∗,
and b = b∗, each CWSP element behaves normally, and the outputs are resistively
driven to a and a · b for the INVERTER and the NAND2 gate respectively. However,
whenever there is an SET event which results in a glitch on any input, the gate stops
driving the output resistively, since both the pullup and pulldown paths are disabled.
At this point the output is held to its last correct value, with a high impedance.
The problem with this approach is that the CWSP element which replaces a k-
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Fig. II.2. CWSP elements for INVERTER and NAND2 gates
input NAND or NOR gate requires 2k series devices, making the approach impractical
for gates with more than 2 inputs. This is because in bulk CMOS technologies, it
is not practical to connect more than 4-5 devices in series, due to body effect [20].
The use of CWSP elements with k > 2 results in the gate becoming quite slow and
utilizing a large circuit area. A modification of [2] which takes care of these issues is
shown in Figure II.3 [3]. The new approach uses only one type of CWSP element.
In particular, this is the CWSP element of an inverter. The additional inversion
that is thus introduced in Figure II.3 (b) is absorbed into the combinational circuit
functionality to yield a logically identical design as Figure II.3 (a).
In Figure II.3, one of the inputs to the CWSP element is driven directly from the
combinational circuit, while the other input is the same output, delayed by δ. The
combinational circuit is implemented to generate the complement of the required
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Fig. II.3. Improvement over the CWSP-based approach of [2] by [3]
output, and the CWSP element provides another inversion. Since the CWSP element
used in Figure II.3 has at most 2 series devices, the delay and area overhead is kept
at a minimum. This approach also averts the need to have a unique CWSP element
for each library gate in the circuit, reducing the design time and cost (in terms of
area, delay and power). However, in both [3, 2], the delay of the circuit is increased
significantly since CWSP elements are introduced before every flip-flop in the design.
In particular, if an SET event results in a glitch of width δ at the un-delayed input
to the CWSP element, it will attain its correct value after time δ. The delayed input
attains its correct value after another delay of δ. Thus, the output of the CWSP
element is guaranteed to be correct after a delay of 2δ. This causes a delay penalty
of 2δ in the functional circuit delay. In [3], an additional delay is introduced by the
CWSP element (DCWSP ) being added to the circuit path. The delay overhead is
therefore given by:
Delay = 2δ + DCWSP
The above equation shows that the delay penalty of the approach is larger than
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twice the SET tolerance achieved, which can be quite large.
The work of this thesis avoids this delay penalty by connecting the CWSP element
off the delay-critical primary circuit path. Also, the work of [3] does not take into
account a possible SET strike at the output of the CWSP element, which is handled
in the approach presented in this thesis, as described in the Chapter III.
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CHAPTER III
APPROACH
The approach presented in this thesis uses CWSP elements [3] to achieve 100% SET
tolerance to glitches induces by radiation transients with a specified value of Q, τα
and τβ. In case of an SET event, the correct value is always computed by the CWSP
element (which is connected in a secondary path, off the functional circuit critical
path). This correct value is used to repeat the computation in case of an SET event,
by introducing a pipeline bubble in the computation. SET tolerance is achieved for
glitches of duration up to min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}. Also, there is no
added design cost associated with altering the combinational portion of the original
design. The CWSP element is connected to the flip-flop inputs and outputs, in a
manner that the additional parasitic capacitances on the functional circuit path are
minimized.
This chapter is divided into three sections. Section III-A describes the proposed
approach at an architectural or system level. In section III-B, the proposed approach
is explained at the circuit level, along with a discussion of the radiation tolerance
of each of the components of the proposed approach. An analysis of the maximum
tolerable glitch width is presented in section III-C.
III-A. System level design
Consider a fragment of the original design, shown in Figure III.1 (a). This consists of
a combinational output which is connected to a flip-flop labeled DFF system. This
flip-flop is in the functional circuit path of the design.
The CWSP based modification as per the proposed scheme is shown in Fig-
ure III.1 (b). The original combinational logic is left intact, except that the flip-flop
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Fig. III.1. Architectural view of the proposed SET tolerant design
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is redesigned (this design is discussed later). In addition, the values of the D and Q
signals of the flip-flop are read by the SET protection logic shown in Figure III.1 (b).
This logic is on a secondary path, and hence the functional delay is impacted only
minimally. The D input of the flip-flop is connected to a minimum-sized inverter,
whose output is fed directly to a CWSP element. Note that the functional D flip-flop
is slightly modified, and labeled as DFF modified. The other input of the CWSP
element is the delayed version of the inverter output (delayed by δ). The output of
the CWSP element (called CW ) is compared with the Q output of the system flip-
flop using a rising-edge triggered equivalence checking circuit, with an output EQ.
As explained earlier, the output of the CWSP element is guaranteed to be correct
after a delay equal to the sum of 2δ and the delay of the CWSP element. Thus, the
equivalence check is triggered after the rising edge of CLK, delayed by the sum of
2δ and the delay of the CWSP element. This delayed clock signal is referred to as
CLK DEL. Under normal operation, EQ is high, since Q is equal to CW . When
there is an SET event, these values can be different causing EQ to fall. In this case,
the current computation is redone using the output of the CWSP element (which is
guaranteed to be correct) as the input to DFF modified in the next clock cycle.
Note that if an SET event is detected at any flip-flop in a design, the computation
needs to be redone for all the flip-flops in the design. Consider a design that has n
flip-flops. If the EQ signal of any of these flip flops becomes low, the computation
needs to be redone for all the flip-flops. A logical AND of all the EQ signals is
therefore computed to obtain a global EQ signal (called EQGLB). If the signal
EQGLB falls, the value of CW (for each of the n flip-flops) is latched into a flip-flop
DFF2, whose output is CW ∗. This value is guaranteed to be error-free1, and is now
if there is an error on CW ∗, this error is silently ignored by the circuit.
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used in the next cycle as the input to DFF modified, so that the current computation
is redone in the next cycle.
The purpose of the flip-flop used to latch the value of EQGLB to produce the
signal EQGLBF is explained next. Suppose there is an SET event in the clock cycle
i which causes the output Qi of the DFF modified to be different from the input Di.
This will cause EQ, and thereby EQGLB to fall. In the next (i+1)th clock cycle, CW ∗
(which is equal to Di) will be latched by the system flip-flop DFF modified. However,
CW is computed using Di+1, which can be different from Di. In the absence of the
flip-flop which generates EQGLBF , EQ (and EQGLB) will remain low in the cycle
i + 1, again triggering a recomputation in the next cycle. This recomputation could
go on indefinitely. The likelihood of two strikes on the proposed SET tolerant design
in two consecutive clock cycles is extremely low2. Hence, if there was an SET event
in clock cycle i which resulted in EQ to be low, it can be safely assumed that there
will be no SET event in clock cycle i + 1 that will make EQ low. As a result, the
EQ and EQGLB signals can be ignored in the (i + 1)th cycle. This can be done by
making EQ and EQGLB high in the next clock cycle. To achieve this, the value of
EQGLB is latched to EQGLBF at the positive edge of CLK. Following an SET
error in cycle i, a low value on EQGLB leads to CW ∗ being used as the input to
DFF modified for cycle i+1. In the Equivalence Checker (Figure III.3), in cycle i+1,
EQGLBF being low will make EQ high and no recomputation will be triggered in
cycle i+2. At the architectural level, the decision to reapply the primary inputs (and
trigger a recomputation) is made if the value of EQGLB is low at the rising edge of
As per [41, 42], the maximum solar proton fluence for particles of energy > 1MeV
based on the JPL- 1991 model is 2.91 × 1011/cm2/year with 99% confidence. The
maximum area and time period for the testcases run was seen to be 473.4× 10−8cm2
and 5.5ns respectively. Using these values, it can be shown that the maximum number
of particle strikes in the testcases run in two consecutive cycles is 4.78× 10−10.
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CLK. This ensures proper handling of glitches.
In Figure III.2, the working of the proposed radiation-hardening approach is
illustrated with the help of timing waveforms. The solid lines correspond to the
circuit operation in fault-free (no SET) state. The broken lines correspond to the
case when there is a negative glitch on the D-input of the modified system flip-flop
DFF modified. The waveforms at all the nodes in the circuit are first explained for
the fault-free case. At time t1, which is just before the positive edge of CLK, there is
a low to high transition on D. This causes the Q output of DFF modified to become
high for the clock cycle i. P ∗, which is the inverted copy of D, falls at time t1. P is
the delayed version of P ∗, so it falls after an additional delay of δ after P (at time
t2 in Figure III.2). At time t2, P and P
∗ are both low, so CW becomes high. Now,
since there was no radiation strike, Q and CW are identical, and so EQ will remain
high. Note that EQ is registered by CLK DEL (the delay for CLK DEL is derived
in section III-C). Since EQ is high, EQGLB remains high. Since CW ∗ is registered
at the falling edge of EQGLB, it will be in an unknown state since EQGLB remains
high. In the next clock cycle, since EQGLB is high, the normal operation continues.
D will be used as the input to DFF modified D becomes low before the next positive
edge of CLK causing Q to fall and all other signals in our circuit are updated in a
similar manner.
Now, consider the case when there is a negative glitch on D at time t1. D
becomes high at time t2 = t1 + δ as indicated by the broken line. An incorrect value
gets registered in the flip-flop DFF modified, making Q low. In comparison to the
case when there was no radiation strike, the D signal is delayed by δ, hence P ∗, P
and thus CW are also delayed by δ. Now, Q (low) being different from CW (high)
makes EQ low. EQGLB falls once EQ becomes low. A falling transition on EQGLB
registers the value of CW to CW ∗. In the next clock cycle, a low value on EQGLB
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causes CW ∗ to be used as the system input. Thus, Q registers the value of CW ∗ and
becomes high, even though the input D is low (this is the desired functionality as a
recomputation is done in the clock cycle i + 1, and hence the value of D from clock
cycle i is used as the input). The entire pipeline is delayed by one clock cycle. Now,
in clock cycle i + 1, note that CWSP uses the value of D in clock cycle i + 1 which
may be different from CW ∗ (as indicated in Figure III.2). Thus, CW become low,
while Q is high. This could have incorrectly made EQ low, signaling an SET-error in
clock cycle i+1, in the absence of the EQGLBF signal explained above. So, the data
on the D input for cycle i+1 will get reapplied in cycle i+2. In the proposed design,
a low value on EQGLB caused EQGLBF to fall in the clock cycle i + 1. Now, a low
value on EQGLBF pulls EQ up in the clock cycle i + 1, thus no recomputation is
triggered in cycle i + 2, as desired.
The CWSP element is upsized to ensure that it is protected against a radiation
strike on the CW node. Note that when a gate is upsized, its drive strength increases,
also the capacitance at the output of the gate increases and both of these properties
contribute in increasing the resilience of the gate against a radiation strike. Thus,
the gate needs to be driven (not floating) to be protected against a radiation strike.
So, upsizing the CWSP element protects its output against a radiation strike only
when it is driven (i.e when both its inputs are identical). A timing constraint on the
minimum combinational delay Dmin of the circuit (discussed in section III-C) ensures
that CW is not floating when its value is being used. Apart from radiation hardening,
the upsizing of the CWSP devices also helps ensure that the capacitances at its nodes
are high enough that the CWSP element is able to hold its last correct state when
there is an SET event resulting in a glitch on one of its inputs. If the delay value
of the delay elements shown in Figure II.1 is δ, then the circuit can be made SET
tolerant by sizing the CWSP element to withstand a glitch of width δ.
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Since the output of the CWSP element is floating whenever its inputs are differ-
ent, it is important to analyze the impact of coupling noise on the CW node when
it is floating. As explained above, the CWSP element is upsized to protect against a
radiation strike on its output, and thus it has a high capacitance. In particular, for
the values of Q, τβ and τα used in our experiments, the CWSP element was upsized to
6× (to 8×). This results in a high capacitance of 3.63fF at the output of the CWSP
element. Also, to ensure that the coupling capacitance of the CW wire (to any of its
neighboring wires) is low, the length of the wire connecting the CWSP element to its
fanouts is kept low. Assume that Metal 1 wire of 1µm length is used to connect the
output of the CWSP element to its fanouts. This results in a coupling capacitance of
0.05fF [43]. It was experimentally verified, via SPICE simulations that a transition
on neighboring wires did not result in any glitch even when CW is floating.
This approach corrects 100% of the SET events. To validate this claim, several
cases were considered. Each of these were analyzed and simulated to confirm that this
approach indeed provides 100% SET tolerance. Note that it is reasonable to assume
that there will not be more than one SET event occurring simultaneously. Thus, all
the nodes in the proposed protection scheme are analyzed independent of the others.
• Suppose there is an SET event which results in a glitch on the inputs of the
CWSP circuit, the CWSP element protects against this glitch, as discussed.
• If there is a radiation strike at the output of the CWSP element, it can result
in a glitch only if the CW node is floating. The Dmin constraint explained in
section III-C ensures that the glitch-free value of CW is used to compute the
EQ signal. Also, the value of CW is registered to CW ∗ on the falling edge of
the EQGLB signal. Since the likelihood of more than one SET strikes in two
consecutive clock cycles is extremely low, if the EQGLB signal is low (because
23
of a radiation strike in the circuit), there cannot be a radiation strike on CW .
Thus, if the CW node is floating at the time it is registered to CW ∗, it will
retain its correct value.
• If there is an SET event in the transitive fan-in of P or P ∗, then this would
have caused the values of P and P ∗ to be different in the worst case, causing
the CWSP element to protect against the glitch.
• If the glitch is caused on Q, then the set of flip-flops that are sequentially adja-
cent to DFF modified are responsible for protecting against it. Since all flip-flops
are implemented with CWSP elements, this causes no erroneous computations.
Further, if a glitch on Q causes EQ to be driven low, then the current com-
putation is redone (albeit needlessly). However, no incorrect computation is
performed.
• If an SET event in the Equivalence Checker circuit or the AND gate AND1
causes EQ and thereby EQGLB to become low, there are two scenarios to be
considered.
– If the glitch is present at the positive edge of CLK, it will lead to a recom-
putation. Since only one SET glitch can occur at a time, the value of CW ∗
will be correct, so the correct computation is redone (albeit needlessly).
– A glitch on EQGLB at any other time is neither latched to EQGLBF nor
it is used to determine the input to DFF modified for the next clock cycle.
It is therefore silently ignored. Also, since the decision to trigger a bubble
in the pipeline at the architectural level is made if EQGLB is low at the
positive edge of CLK, no recomputation will be triggered.
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• If there is an SET event in DFF1, it may lead to EQGLBF being low. This
will ensure that EQ becomes high in the next clock cycle, which is benign
considering that the probability of two strikes in two consecutive clock cycles is
extremely low, as discussed earlier.
• If there is an SET event in DFF2, it might result in a glitch at CW ∗. However,
in that case, EQ would be high, and input D of the system flip-flop would be
used for the computation. Thus, the glitch at CW ∗ is inconsequential.
The key feature of the technique presented in this thesis is that it achieves 100%
SET tolerance, unlike [1]. The SET correction circuitry is connected on a secondary
path (not on the functional path), and hence the delay penalty is extremely small
(much smaller than [1, 3]). The system requires recomputations in case of an SET
event. The above analysis of the CWSP element based SET tolerance circuitry guar-
antees radiation tolerance of the design. In particular, the technique can tolerate
SET glitches up to a width min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}, where ∆1 and ∆2
are fixed delays associated with the SET protection circuitry. The expressions for ∆1
and ∆2 are derived in section III-C.
It is also possible to modify the proposed approach for detection purposes only
and use an alternative scheme for correction, in case an SET-induced error was de-
tected. For example, the entire pipeline can be flushed whenever an error condition is
found (triggered by EQGLB signal being low). This will increase the recovery time,
but the area overhead will be lower. The area overhead for this case was studied
as well, and is presented in section IV-E. Note that the recovery mechanism of the
proposed approach is better than flushing the entire pipeline in case the probabil-
ity of a radiation strike is very high. Consider that the pipeline depth of a design
is twelve and hypothetically, consider that there is a radiation strike every 12 clock
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cycles. Note that the actual probability of a radiation strike is much lower for our
design in a 70nm process (used for our experiments) and it was computed earlier in
this section. However, with technology scaling, the probability of radiation strikes is
expected to increase. Suppose the radiation strike induces an error in a flip-flop be-
longing to the last pipeline stage of a design. If the pipeline is flushed, it will take 12
clock cycles to restore the design to the state it was in just before the radiation strike
had occurred. At this time, there is another radiation strike which again causes the
pipeline to be flushed. This process could go on forever and the circuit computation
will not progress. However, with the proposed recovery mechanism of our approach,
only one clock cycle is lost every time there is an SET induced error. So, the cir-
cuit will continue to do the correct computation, with only one extra clock cycle for
recomputation each time an error is detected.
III-B. Circuit level design
Figure III.3 describes the proposed technique at the gate level. The circuit blocks
(DFF modified, Equivalence Checker and EQGLBF Circuit) from Figure III.1 are
marked with a dotted outline in this figure. The CWSP element and its delay circuitry
is not shown in Figure III.3.
The Equivalence Checker block consists of an XNOR gate, followed by a MUX
with EQGLBF as the select signal. The purpose of this MUX was explained in
section III-A. The output of the MUX is fed to a flip-flop, which is clocked by
the rising edge of CLK DEL (CLK delayed by 2δ + DCWSP ). A logical AND of
the EQ outputs of all the flip-flops in the design is used to generate the EQGLB
signal. Instead of using an AND gate, it is more area efficient to achieve the same
functionality by performing a NOR of the inverted EQ signals. It was experimentally
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seen (using SPICE simulation) that the delay of the pseudo NMOS NOR gate with up
to 30 inputs is reasonable (about 80ps). For designs with more than 30 flip-flops (EQ
signals), a multilevel AND structure was used. Our experiment results account for
the extra delay and area overhead of the multilevel AND gates. For EQGLB signal,
to keep the layout-induced delays low, all the flip-flops that provide input to the AND
gate which generates the EQGLB signal should be placed close to each other. Note
that even if the delay of the AND gate generating the EQGLB signal is high, this
results in an increase in the delay in the secondary path and the functional path is
not impacted. Thus, the delay overhead of the proposed approach will be unaltered
by an increase in the delay for the EQGLB signal. The Master latch of DFF modified
is modified so that when EQGLB is high, the Master latch input is connected to D.
When EQGLB is low (in case of an equivalence check mismatch in one of the flip-
flops), then the Master latch input is connected to CW ∗ (the guaranteed error-free
value).
Devices in the SET protection circuitry are minimum-sized (except in the CWSP
element), to minimize the area overhead required to achieve SET protection. PMOS
gate widths are made the same as NMOS gate widths, for the same reason. The
protection circuit was simulated in SPICE to verify for correct operation. There was
a 66mV reduction in the noise margin of an inverter in the protection logic due to
the skewed sizing approach. However, since this skewed sizing is only used in the
secondary path, and all the nodes in the protection circuitry are SET immune based
on the discussion of section III-A, this is not a problem. The functional path is not
impacted by this skewed sizing.
The delay elements for generating the delayed input P and delayed clock CLK DEL
(Figure III.1) are obtained by connecting a high resistivity POLY2 wire in series with
the input of a minimum-sized inverter (with its PMOS device width equal to the width
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of the NMOS device). For the following discussion, one POLY2 resistor followed by
an inverter is defined as a segment. For τβ = 50ps, τα = 200ps and Q = 100fC, 4
segments are needed to achieve a delay δ, and 8 segments to implement the delay ele-
ment for CLK DEL. For Q = 150fC (same values of τα and τβ), 4 and 10 segments
can be utilized to achieve a delay of δ and CLK DEL respectively. A higher delay
is obtainable with 4 segments for Q = 150fC compared to Q = 100fC by increasing
the value of the POLY2 resistors used. Note that the delay element can be modified
to provide different values of delay by either changing the number of segments or the
value of the resistors. The value of the resistors is limited since the output of the
resistors should transition between V DD and GND within a duration equal to the
segment delay.
Note that in the proposed approach, the Master latch of the system flip-flop
needs to multiplex its input from the combinational logic (if there was no SET in-
duced error) or from the CW ∗ signal (in case there was an SET induced error). To
minimize the delay overhead, the MUX is folded into the Master latch itself. This
results in a minimal delay penalty. The modified Master latches used in the RAZOR
approach [44, 45, 46] add a MUX in the critical delay path.
III-C. Maximum tolerable glitch width
The maximum width of a SET induced glitch that can be protected by the pro-
posed radiation hardening scheme is determined as the minimum of two quantities
(1/2(Dmin −∆1) and 1/2(Dmax −∆2)). Dmin and Dmax are the minimum and maxi-
mum delays of the combinational logic respectively. This section provides the analysis
that yields these two conditions.
In Figure III.1b), consider an SET glitch of width δ at the D input of the system
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flip-flop (DFF modified). Let us assume that the glitch begins just before the rising
edge of CLK. In an unprotected circuit, this could have led to incorrect system
evaluation. The input P ∗ to the CWSP element is at its correct value after time δ.
The second input to the CWSP element attains its correct value after an additional
delay of δ. Thus, the output of the CWSP element is guaranteed to be correct only
after a delay of 2δ + DCWSP , Thus, the P
∗ input to the CWSP element or the D
input of the DFF modified should be stable for a time duration of at least 2δ (i.e. the
new value of D must not be computed before 2δ) to ensure that CW has acquired
the correct value of D. Note that Dmin delay after the positive edge of CLK, the
D input may switch causing P and P ∗ inputs of the CWSP element to be different,
thereby causing CW to float. As mentioned in section III-A, CW is susceptible to a
radiation strike when it is floating. This could be a problem between t3 and the rising
edge of CLK DEL (see Figure III.2). However, the difference between rising edge of
CLK DEL and t3 is the time taken for the combinational part of the Equivalence
Checker circuit to set up to CLK DEL. Thus, to ensure that the guaranteed glitch-
free value of CW is being used to compute EQ, a small guard-band delay (termed ∆1)
is required to be added to Dmin. ∆1 was experimentally found to be equal to 20ps.
Thus, to protect the circuit up to a glitch of magnitude δ, the circuit should have
Dmin ≥ 2δ + ∆1. In other words, the maximum width of a SET induced glitch that
can be protected by the proposed approach is less than or equal to (Dmin −∆1)/2.
δ ≤ (Dmin − ∆1)/2 (3.1)
As described above, the CW signal attains its correct value after a delay of
2δ + DCWSP , where DCWSP is the delay of the CWSP element. Additionally, delay
is introduced by the XNOR gate used for comparison and the MUX with EQGLBF
as the select signal. Thus, CLK DEL should be delayed (compared to the system
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clock CLK) by:
delay for CLK DEL = 2δ+DCWSP+delay of XNOR+delay of MUX+TSETUP EQ
(3.2)
where TSETUP EQ is the setup time of the flip-flop in the Equivalence Checker design.
Now, the CW signal should not be floating (so that a radiation-strike on CW does
not result in a glitch on CW ) when its value is being used to compute the EQ signal.
Since, the EQ signal is registered by CLK DEL, CW signal should not be floating
at the positive edge of CLK DEL. Thus, the input P ∗ to the CWSP element should
be stable till the positive edge of CLK DEL. after a delay of delay for CLK DEL
after the system clock CLK, After CLK DEL becomes high, if the EQ signal goes
low, EQGLB is pulled low and the CW value is latched to CW ∗. In the next clock
cycle, CW ∗ would be used as the input for the system flip-flop. Thus, CW ∗ should
attain its stable value before the next rising edge of the system clock CLK. Therefore,
the minimum time period required for the design to protect a glitch of width δ is given
by the right hand side of Equation 3.3
Dmax + TSETUP SY S + TCLK OUT SY S ≥ delay for CLK DEL
+TCLK OUT EQ + delay of AND1 + TCLK OUT DFF2 + TSETUP SY S (3.3)
where TCLK OUT EQ, TCLK OUT DFF2 and TCLK OUT SY S are the clock to output de-
lays of the flip-flop in the Equivalence Checker, DFF2 and the system flip-flop respec-
tively. TSETUP SY S is the setup time for the system flip-flop. Note that the setup time
forDFF2is not added to the right hand side of Equation 3.3, because CW attains its
stable value before the rising edge of CLK DEL. The left hand side of Equation 3.3
is the minimum duration of the system clock CLK, in terms of the maximum combi-
national delay Dmax and the setup and clock-to-output times of the system flip-flop
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DFF modified. This minimum system clock duration must be larger than the right
hand side of Equation 3.3 for the output CW ∗ to be correctly latched in every clock
cycle.
Using Equations 3.2 and 3.3, the maximum duration of the SET induced glitch
δ which the circuit protects against is:
δ ≤ 1/2(Dmax − (TCLK OUT EQ + TCLK OUT DFF2 + DCWSP
− TCLK OUT SY S + delay of XNOR + delay of MUX + TSETUP EQ
+ delay of AND1))
= 1/2(Dmax − ∆2)
(3.4)
For a circuit with a given maximum delay Dmax, Equation 3.4 can be used to find
the value of the maximum SET induced glitch that the circuit can tolerate using this
approach. The left hand side of Equation 3.3 is the minimum time period of the
design. Thus, if the time period T is directly specified, substituting the expression of
delay for CLK DEL from Equation 3.2 to Equation 3.3, the constraint on δ can be
obtained as:
δ ≤ 1/2(T − (TCLK OUT EQ + TCLK OUT DFF2 + delay of XNOR
+ delay of MUX + TSETUP SY S + DCWSP + TSETUP EQ + delay of AND1))
(3.5)
In order to compare the results of the approach of this thesis with [1], the circuits
presented in the experimental section were designed to tolerate glitches induced by
an SET strike with charge Q = 100fC and 150fC and with τβ = 50ps and τα = 200ps.
These values of Q, τα and τβ were experimentally simulated using SPICE [47], and
found to cause glitches of widths 500ps and 600ps respectively when they strike a
minimum-sized inverter. In order to protect the circuit from SET induced glitches of
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duration 500ps and 600ps, the circuit should have Dmin ≥ 1020ps and 1220ps respec-
tively (from Equation 3.1, using ∆1 = 20ps which was experimentally computed). It
should also have a Dmax value satisfying Equation 3.4.
It is also important to analyze the affect of clock skew. First, the Dmin constraint
of Equation 3.1 is analyzed. As explained earlier in this section, to protect against a
glitch of size δ, the D input of DFF modified should be stable for at least 2δ. Consider
the circuit is working with the minimum time period required for correct functionality
(= Dmax + TSETUP SY S + TCLK OUT SY S as mentioned in Equation 3.3). The worst
case scenario for the constraint of Equation 3.1 happens when, between any two flip-
flops, the Dmax path is sensitized in the i
th clock cycle and the Dmin path is sensitized
in the i + 1th clock cycle. In this scenario, the D input of DFF modified attains its
correct value for the ith clock cycle just before the positive edge of CLK. Now, the
value of D for the i + 1th clock cycle will be updated after a delay of Dmin. Thus,
the value of D for the ith clock cycle is stable only a duration of Dmin. This gives
the constraint of Equation 3.1. Now, if there is a skew between any two sequentially
adjacent flip-flops, the Dmin as well as the Dmax will both be altered by the amount
of skew. The time for which the D input of DFF modified is stable still provides the
lower bound on Dmin. Thus, the constraint of Equation 3.1 is not impacted by skew.
Next, the constraint on the time period or Dmax (Equation 3.3) is analyzed.
This constraint ensures that if there is an SET event in the clock cycle i, CW ∗ is
equal to the correct value of D in the ith cycle and is ready before the i + 1th clock
cycle. Consider any two flip-flops in a design hardened using the proposed approach.
Suppose the signals D1, CLK1, CLK DEL1, EQ1, CW
∗
1 correspond to the first
flip-flop and the signals D2, CLK2, CLK DEL2, EQ2 and CW
∗
2 correspond to the
second flip-flop (these signals have the same meaning as the D, CLK, CLK DEL,
EQ and CW ∗ nets of Figure III.1 which were analyzed in section III-A). Without
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CLK1
−X− D in the ith clock cycle
−X− D in the ith clock cycle
CLK DEL1
EQ1
EQGLB
CW ∗1
t3
clock cycle
CLK2
CLK DEL2
EQ2
CW ∗2
Flip-flop 2
Flip-flop 1
i i + 1
t2t1
Fig. III.4. Analysis of clock skew on the proposed SET tolerant design
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loss of generality, consider the case when the skew between the two flip-flops causes
CLK1 (CLK DEL1) to be delayed compared to CLK2 (CLK DEL2). This is shown
in Figure III.4. The EQ signals are registered at the positive edge of CLK DEL,
thus EQ1 will be registered after a delay equal to the amount of skew compared to
EQ2. Suppose there is an SET event in the i
th clock cycle which causes EQ1 to fall.
As shown in Figure III.4, this causes EQGLB (which is the logical AND of all the
EQ signals) to become low. A falling edge on EQGLB registers the value of D1 in
the ith clock cycle to CW ∗1 and the value of D2 in the i
th clock cycle to CW ∗2 . Now,
CW ∗1 is ready before the next positive edge of CLK1. However, CW
∗
2 is not ready
before the positive edge of CLK2. This is because the minimum time needed for the
value of CW ∗ to be updated in time for the next clock cycle is not met for the second
flip-flop. Thus, the maximum amount of clock skew should be added to the right
hand side of Equation 3.3, to incorporate the clock skew. Thus, the time period or
the Dmax constraint is impacted by the maximum clock skew and becomes tighter by
the amount of skew.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
IV-A. Stimulus and model card for the experiments
The SET tolerance of the radiation-hardened circuit structures proposed in this thesis
(Figures III.1 and III.3) was tested by SPICE [47] simulations. A 65nm BPTM [48]
model card was used, with V DD = 1V and VTN = |VTP | = 0.22V . The benchmark
circuits for the simulations were chosen from the LGSynth93 [49] and the ISCAS85 [50]
design suites.
The radiation strike was modeled as a current source described as I(t) = Q
(τα−τβ)
(e−t/τα − e−t/τβ ) [23, 24].
IV-B. Results using Q, τα and τβ of [1]
In order to compare the experimental results using the approach of this thesis with [1],
the experiments were performed using τβ = 50ps, τα = 200ps and Q = 100fC and
150fC. These values were used in [1] as well. Firstly, a radiation event with these
values of Q, τα and τβ is used to strike a minimum-sized inverter, and the width of the
voltage glitch is experimentally measured. The results from this simulation are shown
in Figure IV.1. Note that the voltage of the node rapidly rises, before saturating at
1.6V. This occurs due to the turning on of junction diodes in the devices (which turn
on at ∼0.6V above VDD). The resulting maximum glitch widths were found to be
500ps and 600ps (for Q = 100fC and 150fC respectively).
Based on this information, the delay elements were designed to have a delay
value δ (for delaying the D signal of DFF modified) and 2δ+DCWSP +TSETUP EQ (for
deriving CLK DEL). The delay circuit was constructed as discussed in section III-B.
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Fig. IV.1. Voltage glitch waveform
Also, the CWSP element of the proposed design should be SET tolerant for
voltage glitches induced by a radiation strike which has τβ = 50ps, τα = 200ps, Q =
100fC and 150fC. The exercise of determining the sizing of the CWSP devices was
conducted via SPICE [47] simulations. The CWSP element for 100fC SET tolerance
was sized 30/121. For 150fC SET tolerance, the CWSP element was sized 40/16.
According to the discussion of section III-C, in order to protect a glitch of maxi-
mum width δ, the minimum value of Dmax can be computed using Equation 3.3. The
only variable quantity in this equation is delay of AND1. For a 30-input NOR gate,
to protect a circuit from glitches of widths 500ps and 600ps, the minimum value of
Dmax was found to be 1405ps and 1605ps respectively. For the testcases with more
than 30 outputs, a multi level gate was used to ensure that the Dmax constraint is
met. Also, the minimum value of Dmin can be computed using Equation 3.1. The
minimum Dmin value is 1020ps and 1220ps for Q = 100fC and 150fC (τβ = 50ps,
A size of X/Y indicates that all the PMOS devices were X times minimum sized, and
the NMOS devices were Y times minimum.
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Table IV.1. Area overhead for Q = 0.15pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Area overhead
Circuit Regular (µm2) Hardened (µm2) %Ovh.
alu2 28.25 37.29 32.00
alu4 53.88 65.88 22.27
apex2 399.67 404.28 1.15
C3540 97.83 130.53 33.43
C6288 223.59 271.09 21.24
seq 421.60 473.53 12.32
C7552 187.68 347.62 85.23
C880 36.15 74.78 106.83
Average 39.31
τα = 200ps) respectively.
The SET tolerant portion of the design proposed in this thesis is not in the
critical path of the system computation. It is sized carefully, so as to add minimal
parasitic capacitances to the system flip-flop delay path. Based on SPICE simulations,
the CLK-to-Q delay (TCLK OUT SY S) increased to 76ps using the proposed approach
(compared to 69ps). However, the setup time (TSETUP SY S) decreased by 2ps (from
40ps to 38ps). Additionally, the increased load on the D input of the Master system
latch resulted in an increase in the delay (by DINPUT LOAD = 6.5ps) of the combi-
national output of the design. As a consequence, the total delay penalty associated
with adding the proposed SET tolerant circuit is 11.5ps per flip-flop. These values
have been used to calculate the delays as per the left hand side of equation 3.3. For
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Table IV.2. Delay overhead for Q = 0.15pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Delay overhead
Circuit Dmax (ps) Regular (ps) Hardened (ps) %Ovh.
alu2 1624.54 1733.54 1745.04 0.66
alu4 1700.28 1809.28 1820.78 0.64
apex2 2069.55 2178.55 2190.05 0.53
C3540 1931.05 2040.05 2051.55 0.56
C6288 5141.06 5250.06 5261.56 0.22
seq 2936.80 3045.80 3057.30 0.38
C7552 2472.79 2581.79 2593.29 0.45
C880 1692.80 1801.80 1813.30 0.64
Average 0.51
the protected case, the extra 6.5ps due to the increased load on the D input of the
Master system latch (explained above) was also included.
Table IV-B shows the area overheads and Table IV-B shows the delay overheads
associated with the proposed approach, for several examples. These tables quantify
the overheads for SET tolerance of up to 150fC. In Table IV-B, Column 1 describes
the circuit under consideration. Columns 2 and 3 report the active area in µm2 for
regular design and a design hardened by the proposed approach. Column 4 reports
the percentage area overhead of this approach. In Table IV-B, Column 1 lists the
circuits under consideration. Column 2 provides the Dmax value for the circuits. As
required, all the testcases in Table IV-B have a Dmax value greater than 1605ps.
Columns 3 and 4 report the delays for a regular design and a design hardened with
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the approach of this thesis. Column 5 reports the percentage delay overhead of the
approach of this thesis. Table IV-B and Table IV-B show the corresponding results
for Q = 100fC.
Table IV.3. Area overhead for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Area overhead
Circuit Regular (µm2) Hardened (µm2) %Ovh.
alu2 28.25 36.38 28.78
alu4 53.88 64.66 20.02
apex2 399.67 403.82 1.04
C1908 43.66 77.01 76.38
C3540 97.83 127.19 30.02
C6288 223.59 266.23 19.07
C7552 187.68 331.22 76.48
C880 36.15 70.83 95.91
seq 421.60 468.22 11.06
C5315 152.17 315.63 107.42
dalu 65.59 87.00 32.63
Average 45.34
As per [51], industrial circuits are typically balanced to have roughly equal
longest and shortest path lengths. This is done in order to avoid hold-time viola-
tions. State of the art technology mapping tools ensure that the Dmin is about 80%
of Dmax [51]. Based on this, Dmin was taken to be 80% of Dmax. Note that the
δ ≤ min{(Dmin −∆1)/2, (Dmax −∆2)/2} constraint is satisfied for all the circuits in
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Table IV.4. Delay overhead for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Delay overhead
Circuit Dmax (ps) Regular (ps) Hardened (ps) %Ovh.
alu2 1624.54 1733.54 1745.04 0.66
alu4 1700.28 1809.28 1820.78 0.64
apex2 2069.55 2178.55 2190.05 0.53
C1908 1562.65 1671.65 1683.15 0.69
C3540 1931.05 2040.05 2051.55 0.56
C6288 5141.06 5250.06 5261.56 0.22
C7552 2472.79 2581.79 2593.29 0.45
C880 1692.80 1801.80 1813.30 0.64
seq 2936.80 3045.80 3057.30 0.38
C5315 1475.91 1584.91 1596.41 0.73
dalu 1489.09 1598.09 1609.59 0.72
Average 0.56
Tables IV-B through IV-B.
The difference in the SET protection circuit (Figure III.1) for Q = 100fC and
150fC is the delay element and the size of the CWSP element. The path through
the system flip-flop remains unaltered. Therefore, the delay penalty in both the
cases is same. Based on the results in Table IV-B and Table IV-B, the average area
overhead is found to be 45.34% (39.31%) for Q = 150fC (Q = 100fC). However,
the corresponding delay penalty is 0.56% (0.51%) which is extremely small. Hence,
the proposed SET protection approach has a negligible delay penalty.
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Table IV.5. Summary of results compared to the approach of [1] and [3]
Technique Area overhead (%) Delay overhead (%) Protection
Our Approach 42.33 0.54 100%
[1] 42.95 2.80 90%
[3] 17.60 28.65 100%
IV-C. Comparison with existing techniques
Table IV-C summarizes the results using the approach of this thesis in comparison
to the results of [1] and [3]. The approach of [1] reports average area overheads
which are comparable, and larger average delay overheads (about 2.8%). Also, the
approach of [1] provides 90% protection to SET induced glitches, while the proposed
approach provides 100% protection. For high speed, mission critical applications, the
reduced delay of the proposed scheme could be extremely crucial, especially when
it comes with a no additional area penalty compared to [1]. In [3], the calculated
average area overheads were about 17.6%. However, the average delay penalty was
quite substantial (28.65%). Therefore, the proposed approach provides an attractive
design point.
IV-D. Smaller values of glitch compared to section IV-B
For the cases in which Dmax is less than 1405ps (corresponding to Q = 100fC), pro-
tection can be provided against SET induced glitches of width up to min{(Dmin −
∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}. To achieve this, in the circuit for SET protection scheme
shown in Figure III.1, the delay element needs to be changed to a value δ = min{(Dmin
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Table IV.6. Area overhead of the proposed protection approach for glitch width up to
δ = min{(Dmin −∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}
Area overhead
Circuit Regular (µm2) Hardened (µm2) %Ovh.
apex4 200.03 225.41 12.69
apex3 139.13 208.59 49.93
b11 opt C 55.43 104.70 88.90
C1355 46.01 88.65 92.67
C432 15.12 24.58 62.54
C499 46.01 88.65 92.67
ex5p 178.18 264.90 48.67
k2 88.53 151.36 70.97
apex1 111.43 174.26 56.39
ex4p 17.59 24.40 38.66
Average 61.41
−∆1)/2, (Dmax −∆2)/2}. This can be achieved by reducing the value of the POLY2
resistors used for the delay element, or by reducing the number of segments used to
construct the delay elements (a discussion on segments and how they are used to con-
struct the delay elements was presented in section III-B . Also, the CWSP element
can be made smaller as well, since it needs to tolerate a glitch of lesser width (com-
pared to Q = 100fC). However, we use the SET protection circuit for Q = 100fC
is used to compute the area overheads shown in Table IV-D. Therefore, this is an
upper bound on the actual area overhead. All the columns in this table have the same
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meaning as the columns of Tables IV-B and IV-B. The delay overhead is presented
in Table IV-D. The delay overhead is calculated in the manner discussed earlier in
this section and all the columns in Table IV-D have the same meaning as those of
Table IV-B. The maximum width of the SET induced glitch (δ) that the proposed
technique can protect these circuits against is shown in Table IV-D. It is equal to
min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2} as per the analysis given in section III-C. For
this computation, Dmin was taken to be 80% of Dmax [51]. The value of ∆2 used was
the same as the value used for the experiments with Q = 100fC, which was equal
to 405ps. From Tables IV-D and IV-D, it can be seen that the delay overhead is
minimal (0.99%) with an area overhead of 61.41%. Note that this area overhead is
an overestimate of the true area overhead (as discussed above).
IV-E. Error recovery using alternative approaches
A mentioned in section III-A, it is possible to modify the proposed approach and
use it for SET-induced error detection only and use an alternative approach (such
as pipeline flushing) for recovery. This will reduce the area overhead of our scheme
since the circuit for recomputation is no longer needed. In Table IV-E, Column 1 lists
the circuits under consideration, Column 2 provides the area overhead in case both
detection and recovery were provided (this is same as the area overhead provided in
Table IV-B). Column 3 provides the area overhead of the proposed circuit if it is
used for detection only (for Q = 0.15pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps). Note that the
reduction in area overhead is very small if we remove the recovery-related circuitry.
Thus, it seems that our approach is best used for detection as well as recovery. Similar
results are provided for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps (Table IV-E) and for
smaller values of Q (Table IV-E).
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Table IV.7. Delay overhead of the proposed protection approach for glitch width up
to δ = min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}
Delay overhead
Circuit Dmax (ps) Regular (ps) Hardened (ps) %Ovh
apex4 1396.65 1505.65 1517.15 0.76
apex3 1230.12 1339.12 1350.62 0.86
b11 opt C 1270.95 1379.95 1391.45 0.83
C1355 1012.19 1121.19 1132.69 1.03
C432 1385.39 1494.39 1505.89 0.77
C499 1012.19 1121.19 1132.69 1.03
ex5p 1195.08 1304.08 1315.58 0.88
k2 1170.34 1279.34 1290.84 0.90
apex1 982.90 1091.90 1103.40 1.05
ex4p 630.38 739.38 750.88 1.56
Average 0.99
IV-F. Power overhead
In this section, the power overhead for our protection scheme is provided. The results
in this section are not compared with [2, 3, 1] since these efforts did not quantify
their power overhead. Typically, it is well known that the power overhead is roughly
equal to the area overhead. To validate this, we computed the increase in average
power (when there is no radiation strike) and the area for a single flip-flop with the
proposed approach. This experiment was carried out for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and
τβ = 50ps and the results are shown in Table IV-F. In Table IV-F, the first column
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Table IV.8. Maximum glitch width δ = min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2} for the
circuits of Tables IV-D and IV-D
Circuit Dmax (ps) Max. Glitch Width δ (ps)
apex4 1396.65 495.83
apex3 1230.12 412.56
b11 opt C 1270.95 432.97
C1355 1012.19 303.60
C432 1385.39 490.19
C499 1012.19 303.60
ex5p 1195.08 395.04
k2 1170.34 382.67
apex1 982.90 288.95
ex4p 630.38 112.69
reports the quantity measured (area, dynamic power and leakage power), the second
column provides the data for an unprotected flip-flop while the third column provides
the data for a flip-flop protected by our approach (using the circuit of Figure III.1).
Column 4 provides the overhead. The area overhead is 6.3×, while the dynamic and
leakage power overhead is 5.5 and 7.3 times respectively. Under normal operation,
note that the portion of our circuit used for recovery is not exercised. Thus, the
dynamic power overhead is slightly less than the area overhead. However, the leakage
power overhead is minimally higher.
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Table IV.9. Area overhead for detection only using the proposed approach for
Q = 0.15pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Circuit %Ovh. (Detection & Recovery) %Ovh. (Detection only)
alu2 32.00 30.58
alu4 22.27 21.53
apex2 1.15 1.05
C3540 33.43 33.02
C6288 21.24 21.06
seq 12.32 12.22
C7552 85.23 85.01
C880 106.83 105.72
Average 39.31 38.77
IV-G. Process and volatge variations
To test the robustness of our circuit under PVT variations, Monte Carlo simulations
were done by varying i) VT , ii) V DD and iii) Lmin. For each parameter, we assumed
the µ to be the nominal value of each parameter. The σ was chosen to be such that 3σ
= 0.1× µ. Each parameter was assumed to be normally distributed. Given the large
number of transistors in the circuit, we assumed that all devices in the design shared
the same value of V DD, VT and Lmin. A total of 500 SPICE simulations were
performed for each parameter. The minimum time period required for the circuit
to work correctly was found, across these variations. As mentioned in section IV-
B, for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps, the proposed approach nominally
protects against a radiation strike on any node in the circuit as long as the Dmin is
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Table IV.10. Area overhead for detection only using the proposed approach for
Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps
Circuit %Ovh. (Detection & Recovery) %Ovh. (Detection only)
alu2 28.78 27.35
alu4 20.02 19.27
apex2 1.04 0.94
C1908 76.38 75.46
C3540 30.02 29.61
C6288 19.07 18.89
C7552 76.48 76.27
C880 95.91 94.80
seq 11.06 10.96
C5315 107.42 107.16
dalu 32.63 32.01
Average 45.34 46.54
more than 1020ps and Dmax is greater than 1405ps. With our approach, a Dmax of
1405ps corresponds to a clock period of (T = Dmax + TSETUP SY S + TCLK OUT SY S +
DINPUT LOAD = 1405 + 79 + 38 + 6.5 = ) 1528.5ps. We would like to know the
amount by which the clock period and Q values are derated due to process and supply
voltage variations.
Our circuit was designed so that it can operate with the minimum time period.
When variations are applied, a guard band is needed since a) the worst case delay with
variations is higher than the nominal delay, so the minimum time period for which
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Table IV.11. Area overhead for detection only using the proposed protection approach
for glitch width up to δ = min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax −∆2)/2}
Circuit %Ovh. (Detection & Recovery) %Ovh. (Detection only)
apex4 12.69 12.49
apex3 49.93 49.64
b11 opt C 88.90 88.17
C1355 92.67 91.80
C432 62.54 59.89
C499 92.67 91.80
ex5p 48.67 48.45
k2 70.97 70.52
apex1 56.39 56.02
ex4p 38.66 36.38
Average 61.41 60.51
the circuit can operate correctly increases b) The delays in the circuit do not scale
by the same amount for all the paths in the design. In particular, consider the case
when the devices in the circuit slow down due to variations. Thus, CW (Figure III.1
described in section III-A) takes longer to achieve its correct value. However, it was
experimentally noticed that the delay for CLK DEL increases by a smaller amount.
Thus, EQ gets registered before CW achieves its correct value. To resolve this issue,
we propose to design the circuit (in the nominal case) for a larger value of charge
than we are required to protect against. This is explained next. In a circuit designed
to handle a radiation strike with charge Q, suppose there is a radiation strike with a
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Table IV.12. Area and power overhead for a single flip-flop for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps
and τβ = 50ps
Metric Regular Hardened Ovh.
Area 0.28 µm2 1.77µm2 6.3×
Dynamic power 1.41e−5 6.11e−5 5.5×
Leakage power 0.014e−5 0.102e−5 7.3×
smaller magnitude of charge Q′ (τα and τβ remaining the same). Suppose the worst
case glitch induced by Q′ is δ′. Since Q′ is less than Q, the glitch δ′ induced by Q′
will be smaller than the glitch δ induced by Q. Under the influence of variations,
CW will achieve its correct value after a delay of δ + δ ′, which is earlier than the 2δ
delay corresponding to a radiation strike with charge Q (in the circuit designed under
nominal conditiond). So, if we strike our circuit designed nominally for a radiation
strike with charge Q, with variations, it can effectively protect the design up to a
smaller value Q′. Similarly, the nominal clock period of the circuit (T ) increases to a
value (T ′) under the influence of variations.
We first calculated the minimum time period T ′ and the Q′ for which our circuit
(designed for Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps with a nominal time period T
= 1528.5ps) operates correctly under 3σ variation in the process and supply volatge
parameters. The results from this experiment are shown in Table IV-G. If V DD, VT
and Lmin are varied independently, the minimum time period T ′ was found to be
1680ps, 1590ps and 1740ps respectively and the value of Q′ was 76fC, 90fC and 72fC
respectively. Thus, the change in VT had a least impact, while a change in Lmin has
the maximum effect. In Table IV-G, the last row provides the results when V DD, VT
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Table IV.13. Minimum time period and charge for which the circuit designed for
Q = 0.10pC, τα = 200ps and τβ = 50ps operates correctly
Variation Q′ (fC) Time period (ps)
V DD 76 1680
VT 90 1590
Lmin 72 1710
consolidated 63 1750
Table IV.14. µ and σ of the time period from Monte Carlo simulations
Variation µ(ps) σ(ps)
V DD 1519.7 50.1
VT 1526.1 14.5
Lmin 1514.2 52.9
consolidated 1525.1 53.1
and Lmin were varied together. The minimum time period for this case was observed
to be 1750ps, and is higher than the previous 3 cases, as expected. Also, the Q′ was
found to be 63fC.
For Monte Carlo simulations, we simulated our circuits with the Q′ and T ′ val-
ues provided in Table IV-G. For the cases when V DD, VT and Lmin are varied
independently, 500 Monte Carlo simulations were done and the resulting time period
was observed for each of these simulations. The results from these simulations are
provided in Table IV-G. A shown in Table IV-G, the µ and σ of the time period was
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Q = 1.59Q′
Run Monte Carlo
simulations to determine
Q′′ and T ′′
Circuit works with Q and T ′′
Chose a higher
value of Q
to Q′
Desired tolerance
Yes
No
Is Q′′ ≥ Q′
Fig. IV.2. Flowchart to determine the value of Q and time period the circuit needs
to be designed with such that it is process variations tolerant against a
radiation strike with charge Q′
found to be 1519.7ps and 50.1ps for V DD, 1526.1ps and 14.5ps for VT and 1514.2ps
and 52.9ps for Lmin variations. For the case when V DD, VT and Lmin are varied
together, 1500 Monte Carlo simulations were done and the resulting µ and σ values
are 1525.1ps and 53.1ps respectively. The µ of the time period is close to the nom-
inal time period for all the simulations. The σ is maximum for the case when all
the parameters are varied together and minimum for VT variations. In all the 3000
simulations, the correct operation was observed under all possible strike conditions,
as expected.
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In order to design a circuit to protect against a radiation strike with charge Q′
and also be variation tolerant, we propose to design the circuit for a larger value
of charge Q. Q can be computed by using an iterative process which is described
in the flowchart shown in Figure IV.2. As mentioned in Table IV-G, for the case
when V DD, VT and Lmin are varied together, the circuit designed nominally for
Q = 100fC operates correctly for Q = 63fC under variations. This indicates that
a circuit needs to be designed for roughly (100/63 =) 1.59 times the charge it is
required to protect against. As indicated in the flowchart of Figure IV.2, first choose
Q = 1.59 ∗ Q′. Design the circuit to protect against a nominal value of Q. Use
Monte Carlo simulations to determine the value Q′′ and clock period T ′′ for which
the circuit operates correctly with variations. If Q′′ ≥ Q′, it means that the circuit
will operate correctly with Q′ and clock period T ′′ (to reduce the area overhead, you
can try reducing the value of Q to determine if there is a smaller Q with which your
circuit can operate correctly under variations). If Q′′ < Q′, it means that the circuit
is still not protected against a radiation strike with charge Q′. In this case, increase
Q and repeat the procedure described above.
By using the approach outlined above, the higher value of Q can be derived along
with the new increased clock period T .
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, a novel radiation-hardened digital design approach is presented. This
approach uses Code Word State Preserving (CWSP) elements at each flip-flop of
the design, leaving the combinational portion of the design unaltered. Since the
CWSP elements are connected off the critical delay path in the design, the pro-
posed SET tolerant approach has negligible delay overheads. The proposed CWSP
based approach provides 100% protection for SET induced glitches of widths up to
min{(Dmin − ∆1)/2, (Dmax − ∆2)/2}. In case an SET error is detected, then the
current computation is repeated, using the correct output, which is generated later
in the same clock period by the CWSP element. The CWSP logic is designed to min-
imally impact the critical delay path of the design, with a delay penalty (averaged
over several designs) of less than 1%. Thus, the proposed technique is applicable for
high-speed designs, where the additional delay associated with SET protection must
be kept at a minimum.
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